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Out of Gas in Turkmenistan: The Stalled Commercial
Law Reform of a Post-Soviet State
BRIAN J. O'SHEA*
At the center of [Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan] ... stands the nation's main monu-
ment: a 20-story three-legged tower known as the Arch of Neutrality. Crowning this remark-
able pedestal is a statute of the leader himself, a golden likeness nearly 40 feet (12 meters)
high. Taller than any Lenin statute from the evil old days, it turns with the hours, so Turk-
menbashi's outstretched arm always seems to be holding the sun and offering it to the
people below.'
I. Introduction
The phrase economies in transition is commonly used to distinguish the full-fledged
market-based, democratic systems of the West from those of the countries of the former
Soviet Union and its satellites. The cold war era dichotomy between western capitalism
and command-and-control socialism no longer exists, so it is thought, and there are now
only the fulfilled market economies of the West and those that are in the process of trans-
forming themselves to that end.'
Turkmenistan, one of the so-called transition states of the former Soviet Central Asian
republics, challenges this view. Following independence from the Soviet Union on October
27, 1991, Turkmenistan declared its intention to transform itself to a free market economy
and seemingly took first steps in that direction. What happens to Turkmenistan, a secular-
Islamic country that possesses an enormous wealth of natural gas and other mineral re-
sources and that is strategically located between powerful Russia and turbulent Iran and
Afghanistan, is not unimportant to the West. However, ten years after independence, Turk-
menistan's transformation has stalled, if it had ever began. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) ranks its economic transition slowest among all former
Soviet and Eastern European countries, and its government is considered one of the most
*Brian J. O'Shea, J.D. Vanderbilt University Law School 1985, is the policy component leader for the U.S.
Agency for International Development AMIR Program, Amman, Jordan. Mr O'Shea is also manager, U.S.
Agency for International Development Trade & Investment Project, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan (May 1999-
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1. Joseph Fitchett, Cult of the Great Leader Lives on in Turkmenistan, INT'L HERALD TRIR., Aug. 14, 2000,
available at www.iht.com/IHT/DIPLO/00/jf080800.html.
2. See, e.g., EUR. BANR FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., TRANSITION REPORT 1999 (1999).
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repressive and least democractic in the region. Rather than transition to a market economy,
independent Turkmenistan appears to have taken a different path, one in the direction of
establishing a permanently authoritarian nation.
Ten years into Turkmenistan's transition, the state's control continues to pervade all
aspects of private sector business relationships. Through its foreign investment and regis-
tration regime, the state determines who may enter the market and on what terms. Through
its licensing laws, the state closely reviews and controls the activities a firm may engage in.
Through foreign exchange and trade rules, the state approves the prices on which a firm
may conclude its private contracts.
This article examines Turkmenistan's reformed commercial law regime to identify the
main adminisrative and regulatory barriers to trade and investment. It begins with a de-
scription of the main external factors that have shaped the character of Turkmenistan's
commercial law regime in the first ten years of independence. It continues with a review of
Turkmenistan's main business laws and, based on survey and observations by the author of
businesses operating in Turkmenistan, the impact of the commercial law regime on business
formation and operations. The article concludes with a prognosis for further reform.
II. The Main Determinants of Turkmenistan's Transition
Turkmenistan lies on the southern edge of the former Soviet Union; it is bordered by
the Caspian Sea and Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the south, and the remaining Central
Asian republics and Russia to the north and east. In land area it is slightly larger than
California, although approximately ninety percent of the country is desert, and it has a
population of just 4.5 million.4
Above all, three factors might be said to determine the fate of independent Turkmenistan:
(1) its wealth of gas reserves and other natural resource, (2) its geographic remoteness, and
(3) its authoritarian president, Saparmurat Niyazov.
With some justification, Turkmenistan has been described as the "Kuwait of the Cas-
pian." It owns 1.7 trillion cubic meters of proven recoverable reserves of natural gas, the
fourth largest in the world.' It has an estimated six to eight billion tons of oil reserves.6 The
Kara-Kum Desert of Turkmenistan contains the world's third largest deposits of sulfur.'
The country is among the top ten cotton producers worldwide.'
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOR 1999 (2000), available at www.state.gov/www/
global/human-rights/1 999_- hrp.report/turmeni.html.
4. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTROOK 2000 (2000),availableatwww.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/index.html. The majority of Turkmenistan's population is ethnic Turkmen (77%) and Muslim (89%).
Id. Turkmenistan became a part of Russian Turkistan in 1881 and a constituent republic of the USSR in 1925.
There remains today a small, albeit diminishing, Russian population (10% of the population). See FED. RE-
SEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TURKMENISTAN AREA HANDBOOK, available at http://Acweb2.loc.gov/frd/
cs/tmtoc.html (data as of Mar. 1996) [hereinafter TURKMENISTAN AREA HANDBOOK].
5. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REPORT No. 99/140, TURKMENISTAN: RECENT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS 12 (1999) [hereinafter IMF REPORT]. Only Russia, the United States, and Canada have natural
gas reserves larger than those of Turkmenistan. See TURKMENISTAN AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
6. Irina Begjanova, U.S. Embassy, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, Oil and Gas Sector in Turkmenistan (Sept.
1999), at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/9909txEnergy.htm.
7. Bus. INFO. SERV. FOR THE NEWLY INDEP. STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TURKMENISTAN: BISNIS
COMMERCIAL OVERVIEW (Mar. 2000), at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/Turkmenistan.htm [hereinafter
BISNIS COMMERCIAL OVERVIEW].
8. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 4.
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In the Soviet period, Turkmenistan stood in a colonial relationship to the other republics,
with its raw materials exploited for their benefit and other sectors of its economy left un-
developed.9 Although the political relationship with Russia has now changed, the structure
of Turkmenistan's economy largely remains the same. Natural gas, oil, and cotton produc-
tion account for over 70 percent of economic activity in Turkmenistan and over 90 percent
of export revenue,' 0 and Turkmenistan's main export markets remain states of the former
Soviet Union." As was also true during the Soviet period, production of these main com-
modities continues today to be owned or controlled by the state.'2
Despite its wealth of natural resources, Turkmenistan remains one of the poorest coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union republics. An estimated 48 percent of its population lives
at or below the poverty level, and it has the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest life
expectancy of all countries of the region.'"
In some measure, the country's poverty is the result of its unfortunate geography. It is
landlocked by countries that are either too poor to pay for Turkmenistan's natural gas or
are competitors in their own right for the richer Western energy markets. Turkmenistan's
outlets for natural gas exports are currently limited to two options. One is a pipeline north
to connections with Russia's gas network; the other is a pipeline south to Iran, which was
completed in 1997. However, Russia has kept the western, hard currency markets for its
own gas and has allowed delivery of Turkmen gas only to the cash-poor former Soviet
countries' 4 while Iran's demand has been low and, in any event, it has not always been able
9. During the Soviet period,
planning and administration of Central Asian economy [laid] in the hands of the bureaucracy of min-
istries staffed and- located in Moscow. Their union-wide priorities relegate[d] regional interests to
second place. The result [was] a kind of internal colonial arrangement in which raw materials pro-
ceed[ed] from Central Asia to the USSR center for exploitation. The authorities transport[ed] most of
Central Asia's main agricultural and industrial production-such as cotton, beef and hides, oil and
gas-to other users.
CErRAL AsIA: 130 YEARs OF RussiAN DOMINANCE, A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 565-66 (Edward Allworth ed.
1994).
10. IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 47-49. In the 1993-1998 period, exports of natural gas accounted for
approximately 60% of Turkmenistan's total exports by value, oil products accounted for 13%, and cotton fiber
exports approximately 18%. Id. at 118. Other important exports include textile products such as yarns, fabrics,
and jeans (18% of 1998 exports, or $111 million), much of which is produced by joint ventures with foreign
investment. Id. at 8, 49.
11. IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 122 (table 32) (indicating that approximately 66% of Turkmenistan's
exports were made to CIS countries in the 1994-1998 period). Nevertheless, it should be noted that over that
period exports to non-CIS countries as a percentage of total exports has steadily risen.
12. Id. at 13-14 (noting that the oil and gas industry consists of five state enterprises, and the sector is under
the close supervision of the president). "The state exercises strict control over the agriculture sector, with two
major crops-wheat and cotton-produced and marketed under a state order system." Id. at 60.
13. The World Bank Group, Country Brief: Turkmenistan (Sept. 2000), atwww.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
regions.htm. In 1997, infant mortality rate was 38 per 1000 live births, and life expectancy was 65.4 years. Id.
The average monthly wage in December 1998 was 303,303 manats (the local currency), IMF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 99, equivalent at that time to about $25 at the street exchange rate, id at 11.
14. IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. As of January 1998, Turkmenistan's claims against former Soviet
countries on rescheduled debt for gas exports totaled approximately $1.3 billion. Id. at 50.
15. Id. at 16-17. Iran, like Russia, has large gas reserves of its own and thus competes with Turkmenistan
for the same hard currency markets. Id.
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to pay for gas received.Is Since independence, Turkmenistan has attempted through various
negotiations to construct alternative pipeline routes, but all have proven unsuccesful.
16
Geography has also shaped Turkmenistan's foreign policy. Wary of Russia, its powerful
former master to the north, and fearing entanglement with the Islamic-fundamentalist tur-
bulence to the south in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan has vigorously pursued
a positive neutrality. This is the principle that Turkmenistan will not involve itself with
affairs or conflicts of other states in return for recognition of Turkmenistan's independence
and sovereignty over its internal affairs. On December 12, 1995, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly formally recognized Turkmenistan's declaration of permanent neutrality, an
event as important to the young country's national identity as its day of independence. 7
Critics have viewed Turkmenistan's application of positive neutrality in the realm of
foreign trade and investment as a form of isolationism." While pursuing preferential trade
agreements with individual countries (such as trade agreements with Iran, Turkey, and
Ukraine' 9) it has largely resisted integration into regional or multilateral groups. It is not
a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) customs union and is one of
only two former republics that has not sought membership in the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). Turkmenistan severly restricts its citizens travel outside the country by a
system of exit visas, and the country maintains a Soviet era system of internal passports and
checkpoints for travel within the country.20
The third essential determinant of Turkmenistan's present commercial law regime is its
strange and despotic ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov, the self-proclaimed Turkmenbashi or fa-
ther of the Turkmen people. The chairman of the former Communist Party of Turkmen-
istan, Niyazov has been the country's only president since its independence. Although Turk-
menistan's constitution provides for a democratic, presidential republic2" with a popularly
elected legislative body (the fifty-member Medjlis) and an independent judiciary,22 in fact,
16. These include a proposed trans-Caspian pipeline to be built by a consortium including Bechtel Enter-
prises and GE Capital Construction and Financial Group, and would have linked Turkmenistan to Turkeyvia
Azerbaijan and Georgia. IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-17. Unfortunately for Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan
discovered a large deposit of natural gas in its sector of the Caspian soon after the consortium was formed
and, two years after inception, the project terminated due to failure of the investors and countries involved to
agree to terms of compensation and transit. See Michael Lelyveld, Turkmenistan: Transcaspian Consortium
Closing, RADIO FREE EuR./RADIO LIBERTY, June 20, 2000, available at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/06/
F.RU.000620135831 .html. Other pipeline options under consideration by Turkmenistan include a project with
China and Japan to take Turkmen gas 1605 kilometers east to the border of China, and a pipline to Pakistan
and the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan. See U.S. Embassy Ashgabat, Turkmenistan Energy Sector Notes
June-July 2000 (July 27, 2000), available at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/000801 txener.htm.
17. Maintenance of International Security, G.A. Res. 80, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 112, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/50/80 (1995). Two crossed olive branches, symbolizing neutrality, appear on Turkmenistan's flag;
the Arch of Neutrality, a monument commemorating Turkmenistan's declaration of neutrality, is constructed
in the center of Ashgabat; and December 12 is observed in Turkmenistan each year as a national holiday.
18. See, e.g., Turkmenistan: The New Hermit Kingdom, GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, July 27, 2000, at
www.stratfor.com/cis/countriesfrurkmenistan/default.htm.
19. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FY 2000 COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: TURKMENISTAN 43 (July 1999), at
www.state.gov/www/about-state/business/com-,guides/2000/europe/turkmenistan-CCG2000.pdf[hereinafter
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE].
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOR 1999, supra note 3, at § 2(d).
21. TURKM. CONsT. art. I ("Turkmenistan shall be a democratic, law-based and secular state in which the
state rule shall be implemented in the form of a presidential republic").
22. Id. art. 4 ("State shall be based on the principle of separation of powers-the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary-which shall exercise their authority independently and interactively, checking and balancing
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Turkmenistan is a one-man state in which Niyazov pre-selects all members of the Medjlis,
controls the judiciary, and deals harshly with any political dissent.23 All important decisions
of the government, particularly those affecting the economy, are said to be taken under his
personal direction,24 and a significant amount of government revenue is transferred directly
to funds under his personal discretion.25
Niyazov's domination of the Turkmen people is reinforced through an oppressive state-
sponsored personality cult, a feature of the country most remarkable to first-time foreign
visitors.2 6 For example, his larger-than-life portrait hangs on the entrance to all public
buildings and private firms, his picture appears on all of the country's currency and daily
on the front page of each newspaper, state television dedicates each evening program to his
activities and pronouncements, numerous public monuments have been raised in his honor,
and Turkmen reciting the national oath of allegiance ask that their life be taken if they use
his name in vain. In December 1999, Turkmenistan became the first former Soviet country
to return officially to autocracy when its legislative body amended the country's constitution
to allow Niyazov to serve as president for life.27
The character of Turkmenistan's commercial law regime in its first ten years has been
strongly influenced by three factors: gas, geography, and Niyazov. To overcome the dis-
advantages of its geography and to establish commercial links with the West, as well as to
one another"). The Medjlis consists of 50 deputies elected from territorial districts of approximately equal
number of voters and serving a 5-year term. Id. art. 63. In addition to the Medjlis, the constitution provides
for a super-legislative body, the Halk Maslakhaty, or People's Council, which is comprised of the president,
members of the Medjlis, and officials from the national and local governments. It meets once a year to consider
and make recommendations on larger issues of state, such as changes to the constitution, ratification of treaties,
and declarations of war. Id. arts. 48-53. Prior to amendment in 1999, the constitution provided that the terms
of office of the president shall be 5 years, and that the same person may not serve as president more than two
terms in succession. Id. arts. 55-56.
23. "What we have now is not a state-it's just a single person. The government posts and ministries are
nothing. It is a profanity." Interview by Eurasia Foundation of Avdy Kuliev, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Turkmenistan (Mar. 21, 2000), at www.eurasianet.org/cen-eurasia/departments/qanda/articles/
qa032100.shtml.
24. BISNIS COMMERCIAL OVERVIEW, supra note 7, ch. 2 ("currently, the Turkmen economy is tightly con-
trolled by the government, with President Niyazov making all key decisions"). A leading Central Asia expert
has the following perspective concerning the quality of those decisions:
For all their political shrewdness and administrative acumen, the Caspian leaders lacked the kind of
basic knowledge of what the world beyond their borders looked like and how it functioned. Victims
of the ideological system that had produced them, the first post-Soviet heads of state were far less
worldly than the post-colonial leaders of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had been. Many had little knowl-
edge of the most elementary questions of finance and trade, not to mention the more complex ones of
how the global markets function in the energy sector. All these questions had been handled byspecialists
in Moscow, people with whom most of the new Caspian leaders and their close associates generally
had little direct contract.
Implementation of U.S. Policy on Caspian Sea Oil Exports, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economic
Polity, Export and Trade Promotion of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41 (1998)
(statement of Dr. Martha Brill Olcott).
25. These include the president's fund, sometimes called the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, into which
half of the export earnings of state enterprises (gas, oil, cotton) must be deposited, and which is used to finance
construction of monuments to the president and other national prestige constructions. See IMF REPORT, supra
note 5, at 28.
26. Fitchett, supra note I (characterizing Turkmenistan as a "Stalinist Disneyland").
27. Bruce Pannier, Turkmenistan: Niyazov Named President For Life, RAoIO FREE EuR./RAnio LIBERTY,
Dec. 30, 1999, available at www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/12/f.r.991230155828.html.
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diversify the structure of its colonial economy, the country has recognized from indepen-
dence the need for foreign investment capital and all of its attendant benefits (transfer of
technology, managerial, and technical skills, and so on). To induce such foreign investment,
the country recognized early the need to create a commercial law structure that is supportive
of a free market. Most of the laws regulating business over the first ten years of indepen-
dence were thus enacted by the Medjlis shortly after Turkmenistan's succession from the
Soviet Union, including laws on business organizations, entrepreneur and investor's rights,
and rights and protections for foreign investors. As described below, these laws, at least as
written, generally suggest an open, liberalized legal regime for trade and investment. How-
ever, as described later, this impulse toward openness that is expressed in the laws is in large
measure subverted in implementation through presidential decrees or government regu-
lations by means of which the state continues to maintain tight control over private
sector activity.
IMl. Commercial Law Regime
A. BusINESs FORMATION
Given a fifty-year history of Soviet-managed economy and a people with limited exposure
to market activity, it is not surprising that Turkmenistan's first commercial laws are rudi-
mentary and incomplete, at least from a western perspective.28 Rather than prescribing a
framework of rights and relationships among firms, their managers, beneficiaries, and cred-
itors, they might be better viewed as a declaration of first principles or an entrepreneur's
bill of rights, intended to carve out a space for free-market commercial activity from the
formerly state-dominated economy.
The 1993 Law on Entrepreneurial Activity thus sets out a definition of entreprenurial
activity: It is "profit seeking activity of persons or legal entities carried out at their own
risk."29 The law states who may be an entrepreneur (any "physical persons and legal entities
of Turkmenistan and other states, as well as persons without citizenship" 30) and his basic
rights: the right to choose his own suppliers and customers, 31 the right to use profits gen-
erated by his activity, the right to acquire and dispose of property,32 the right to participate
in foreign trade, and the right to establish his own prices.3 3 The general obligations of an
entrepreneur are also given: entrepreneurs are required to comply with the labor and wage,
environmental, licensing, tax, and consumer protection laws of Turkmenistan 34 and are
28. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw (Apr. 2000), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract_id = 229956, in which the authors posit that the essential function of
a business organization law in a developed market economy-one that cannot be accomplished by a law of
contracts alone-is (1) to shield the personal assets of owners and managers from claims by creditors of the
firm and (2) to protect the assets of the firm from claims by the owner or managers' personal creditors.
Turkmenistan's enterprise law only touches upon liability of owners for obligations of the legal entity, and
contains no provisions whatsoever regarding rights of the legal entity against claims by creditors of the firm's
owners or managers.
29. Zakon Turkmenistana 0 Predprinematelskoi Deyatelnocti art. 1 (1993) (Turkm.) [hereinafter Entre-
preneurship Law].
30. Id. art. 3.
31. Id. art. 6.
32. Id.
33. Id. This right, however, is explicitly subject to other, unspecified "legislation of Turkmenistan."
34. Id. art. 7.
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prohibited from engaging in monopolistic behavior or unfair competition (terms that are not,
in fact, defined in this or other laws of Turkmenistan).
A companion law, the Law on Enterprises of 1993, sets out the forms of permitted
business organizations as well as their respective rights and obligations." The law recognizes
three forms of non-state, commercial enterprises.3 6 These are individual (family) enter-
prises;37 cooperative enterprises; 8 and companies, 9 each of which is distinguished by the
number of owners and the extent of their personal liability.
As under the law on entrepreneurship, the apparent main concern of the Law on Enter-
prises is to define the basic rights of a private firm vis-i-vis a state that had until recently
controlled all aspects of the economy. Thus, the law states that enterprises shall have the
right to plan their own activities,40 determine the structure of their own management and
hire their own managers,41 determine their prices,42 retain their profits,43 engage in foreign
trade,- and form associations to advance their own interests.4
As a statement of principles, Turkmenistan's early commercial laws may leave the im-
pression of a state that has guaranteed a space for private sector free from interference. In
fact, these principles have been largely subverted in their implementation by presidential
decrees and regulations, and the state continues to play a dominant role in the life of a
business from cradle to grave. This domination of the state in private sector activity is
particularly evident in the rules governing business registration, licensing, foreign exchange,
and import-export trade.
B. REGISTRATION
Registration is the first choke-point through which a business must pass to operate in
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan law prohibits one from engaging in any entrepreneurial ac-
35. Zakon Turkmenistana 0 Predpriyatiyax (1993) (Turkm.) [hereinafter 1993 Enterprise Law]. In addition
to the business forms recognized by this law, joint stock companies are recognized under Turkmenistan's 1999
Law on Joint Stock Companies, Zakon Ob Akzeonemix (1999) (Turkm.).
36. 1993 Enterprise Law, supra note 35, arts. 4-13. In addition, the law recognizes a "state enterprise,"
which is formed on the basis of property contributed by the state and subject to state management, id. art. 5,
and an "enterprise of public association," which is founded on the basis of property contributed by public,
religious, or charitable entities. Id. art. 6.
37. Id. art. 4. The law defines "individual (family) enterprises" as firms that are owned by an individual or
a family, and these individuals are personally liable for the obligations of the enterprise. Although the law
defines such firms as "independent subject with rights of a legal entity," id. art. 1, it is not specified in what
sense they are independent, given that the individual owners of the firm are personally liable for the firm's
obligations.
38. Id. art. 7. These are entities organized under a charter whose members bear liability in proportion to
their share of ownership in the enterprise.
39. Id. art. 8. The law provides for three forms of enterprises: complete, mixed, and limited. In complete
companies, participants bear personal, joint liability for obligations of the firm; in mixed companies, the active
members of the company bear personal, joint liability, while the non-active member-depositors are liable only
to the extent of their contribution to the firm; in limited companies all participants' liability is limited to their
contribution share.
40. Id. art. 15.
41. Id. arts. 25 and 26.
42. Id. art. 17.
43. Id. art. 16.
44. Id. art. 19.
45. Id. art. 11.
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tivity whether as a legal entity or an individual without first registering with the state. 46
This obligation of an entrepreneur to register is reinforced throughout Turkmenistan's
business laws. A certificate of registration is required in order for an enterprise to open a
bank account. It is required for a business to register with the state tax inspectorate. A
business cannot obtain the licenses necessary to operate without a certificate of registra-
tion.47 It is required in order to register contracts with the State Commodity Exchange,
which is in turn a precondition of engaging in import-export activity as well as obtaining
access to hard currency necessary to purchase imports. A business is not able to file import
or export declarations with customs unless it is registered. 48 A business that attempts to
operate without registration must necessarily violate tax rules because it cannot register
with tax authorities without a registration certificate and therefore cannot report and pay
required taxes. The income of any persons or entities that attempt to engage in business
activity without registration is subject to forfeiture. 49
As in the West, a purpose of registration is to create a legal entity with the capacity to
act and to place the entity's data in the public record. But this is a minor purpose. The
primary purpose of registration in Turkmenistan is to provide the state an opportunity to
examine the proposed activities of an enterprise by the state registrar to determine whether,
in the state's view, they are feasible and whether they comport with the laws, regulations,
and policies of the government. The state may thus refuse to register a proposed business
if it finds that the founders do not have the ability or means to carry out the business or if
it believes the organization intends to carry out activities inconsistent with the president's
social or political policies1s
Pursuant to a decree of the president, registration of businesses of all ownership forms
is under control of the State Agency for Foreign Investment (SAFI), the head of which is
the president himself." Depending on the form of business that the founders seek to reg-
ister, SAFI regulations require presentation of ten or more documents, including business
plans, consularized extracts from official records, personal information about the founders,
and a foundation agreement and charter. Although the law requires SAFI to complete
registration processing within one month of receiving all required documents, in practice,
one month is a minimum period in which an applicant can hope to complete registration."2
According to an informal survey of businesses operating in Turkmenistan, the registration
46. Entrepreneurship Law, supra note 29, arts. 3-4. Although the law allows for an individual to engage in
entreprenurial activity without forming a legal entity, such individuals nevertheless are required'to registerwith
the state.
47. See Zakon Turkmenistana 0 Lizenzirovanin Otdelnix Vidov Deyatelnocti art. 11 (1999) (Turkm.) [here-
inafter Licensing Law].
48. Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 3316 (1997) (Turkm.) [hereinafter Registration Decree]
(approving a regulation of the state registration body, the State Agency for Foreign Investment, entitled "On
the Registry and the Single State Register of Enterprises And Organizations of Turkmenistan").
49. Activities of an unregistered enterprise are .prohibited, and its income is subject to penalty by a court
order. 1993 Enterprise Law, supra note 35, art. 28.
50. For example, if the founders of a proposed medical practice do not have the requisite education or
experience, in SAFI's view, registration may be refused. Memorandum from Lyudmila Imancheva, Registration
Chamber of the State Agency for Foreign Investment to Gary Kelly, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. Trade and
Investment Project (July 30, 1998) (discussing documentary requirements for registration).
51. See Registration Decree, supra note 48.
52. See 1993 Enterprise Law, supra note 35, art. 28; ERNST & YOUNG, TURKMENISTAN: A BUSINESS AND
INVESTMENT GUIDE 9 (1999).
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process can take on average sixty days to complete, although delays of three months or
longer are not unknown."
Although the Law on Enterprises requires applicants to submit information for registra-
tion only to a single governmental authority, 4 in practice, to complete the registration
process at SAFI, a business also must separately submit for approval applications and sup-
porting documents to the tax and statistics authorities as well as the internal affairs ministry
(to register the company stamp), thus further complicating and delaying registration by
involvement of additional oversight bodies."
Registration of enterprises with foreign partners is particularly challenging. The regis-
tration process with respect to such entities is used by the SAFI to screen the merits of the
foreign investor's proposed investment project, although the criteria against which the pro-
ject is measured is far from transparent. Again as the result of a decree of the president, to
register, a foreign investor is required to submit considerable information and documents
establishing the economic and technical feasibility of the investment and its economic im-
portance to Turkmenistan16 These can include marketing analysis, description of the tech-
nology that will be used, raw material supply analysis, financial analysis, and management
plan, all of which is evaluated by the SAFI and other relevant government ministries.57 It
is said that the president himself, the head of SAFI, provides the final decision of whether
a foreign investment proposal may be implemented and an entity may be registered." s
In 2000, Turkmenistan enacted a new law on enterprises to replace the 1993 law. 9 Al-
though the new law provides greater transparency in the registration process 60 and limits
the period of registration to two weeks, 61 in most other respects the new law does not greatly
change the status quo. The distinctions between different business forms remains vague,
53. U.s. Agency for Int'l Dev. Trade and Investment Project, Administrative and Regulatory Environment
for Business in Turkmenistan 8 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Administrative and Regulatory Environment]. The
author participated in preparation of this report, which was based on surveys of approximately 35 local busi-
nessmen in 1998 and 1999.
54. See 1993 Enterprise Law, supra note 35, art. 28 (providing that once the state registration bodyapproves
the registration application, it (not the applicant) has the obligation to notify other governmental authorities).
55. See IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at n.17.
56. See COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE, supra note 19, at 10-11; Postanovlenie Prezidenta No. 2650 (1996)
(Turkm.) (hereinafter State Registrar Decree] (approving SAFI procedures for "registration, approval, and
monitoring the realization of programs with foreign capital participation in Turkmenistan").
57. Accordingly, the SAFI is required to examine the project's feasibility report, the "economic efficiency
of the project," the Ministry of Economy and Finance's report on social and labour "acceptablity" of the
project, a report of the Ministry of Justice on legality of the project, and the project proponent's financial and
audit report, among others. See State Registrar Decree, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. Zakon Turkmenistana 0 Predpriyatiyax (2000) (Turkm.) [hereinafter Law on Enterprises (2000)]. The
impetus for the new law was Turkmenistan's enactment of a new civil code in 1998, which establishes a
comprehensive framework for Turkmenistan's second-generation commercial law. Grazhdanskii KodeksTurk-
menistana Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (1998). It was developed with technical assistance of European Union
and USAID experts and entered into force on March 1, 1999.
60. In contrast to the prior law, the new enterprise law lists all documents required for registration and the
information required in the registration application, and it requires that the state registrar provide written
reasons if an application is refused. Law on Enterprises (2000), supra note 59, arts. 17-18.
61. Id. art. 16. Whether this limitation of the period of registration will improve the registration process
will depend upon implementation. Under the 1993 law, the state registrar was required to complete registration
within one month, a limitation that was commonly not observed in practice. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
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leading to the possibility of improper registration or cancellation of registration. The state
registrar retains authority to cancel registration, and businesses must repeat the registration
process upon any change in their activities, owners, or address.62 At least in one important
measure, the new law imposes greater government control over private enterprise. Under
the new law, all businesses, including individual entrepreneurs, will be subject to minimum
capital or charter find requirements, the timely payment of which is apparently to be policed
by the state registrar.6
3
C. BUSINESs LICENSING
Once registered, most businesses in Turkmenistan are required to obtain one or more
licenses to begin operations. Approximately sixty different kinds of business activities re-
quire a license under Turkmenistan's licensing law.6 The purpose of licensing, as stated in
the law, is to ensure protection of public health, safety, and morals as well as protection of
environment and consumer rights. 65 In the main, the business activities that are subject to
licensing implicate these important state interests, such as activities in the area of pest and
rat control, manufacture of narcotics and psychotropic substances, operation of gasoline-
filling stations, and lottery and gambling.66 However, a number of categories of activities
covered by the licensing law might be said to reflect a state's intent to control activity for
political purposes, such as printing business; publishing business; activities in culture and
art areas; manufacture and distribution of movies and video film; and NGO activities in
physical, cultural, health and sports.
67
The law requires a business to obtain a separate license for every activity subject to
licensing, and each required license is issued for a limited duration.68 It is thus not unusual
for a business to operate under a number of different licenses at any one time or to be
regularly in the process of applying for a new license or renewal.
62. Id. arts. 21 (re-registration of enterprises), 22 (cancellation of enterprises), 24-30 (organizational legal
forms of enterprises). As under the 1993 law, the new law on enterprises provides for individual enterprise, a
cooperative enterprise, and economic associations.
63. Minimum charter fund amounts are stated in terms of a fixed minimum salary. The owners of the
enterprise are required to pay one-half of the specified amount prior to registration, and pay the balance within
one year after registration. Id. art. 48. A minimum salary is approximately $77 for jobs in the state sector, and
$96 for private sector jobs. See U.S. Embassy, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan Market Survey August
2000 (Sept. 7, 2000), at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/000907txmrkt.htm. The minimum charter fund for
individual enterprises is twenty-five minimum salaries, fifty minimum salaries for cooperative enterprises, and
100 minimum salaries for economic associations. See Law on Enterprises (2000), supra note 59, arts. 26-29.
64. See Licensing Law, supra note 47. As a step toward greater transparency in licensing, the law states that
it is intended to provide a framework or "common state policy" pursuant to which the various state licensing
bodies are to establish specific requirements and procedures for issuance, control, and termination of business
licenses. Id. art. 2.
65. Id. art. 5 ("an activity is considered to be subject to licensing if its conduct may result in injury to rights,
legitimate interests, morals and health of population as well as government concerns, and such activity cannot
be regulated by methods other than licensing").
66. Id. art. 18. Most or all activities related to gas and oil extraction and processing are subject to licensing
under the law-surveying, exploration, construction and repair of equipment, processing, design and construc-
tion of pipelines-reflecting the singular importance of these sectors to Turkmenistan's economy.
67. Id.
68. Id. arts. 8(l) (stating that "a separate license shall be issued for each business activity subject tol icensing"),
9 ("license validity period shall be determined by the regulation on licensing the specific activity, but in any
event no less than three years").
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Perhaps more problematic for businesses is that the law covers certain broad categories
of business activity in addition to the specific activities. These include the category of trade
activity, in which many or all businesses might be said to engage, at least in part. Because
it is left to the government to decide whether a business engages in trade activity and is
therefore subject to licensing, a firm operates at its peril in Turkmenistan wthout first
approaching licensing authorities.
Further complicating businesses' compliance with the law is the fact that over twenty-
five government ministries and organizations have authority to issue licenses. For an ap-
plicant to obtain a license, many of these bodies require that the applicant present certifi-
cates or approvals from other government bodies, such as the sanitary inspectorate,
standards inspectorate, and fire authorities. While the licensing law requires a state licensing
body to grant or deny an application for a license within one month of submission, in
reality, delays of six months or longer are not unknown. Each of these separate licensing
bodies has authority to conduct inspections of businesses as well as to suspend or cancel
licenses unilaterally without prior administrative or judicial process. The costs of firms'
compliance are not insignificant even if the licensing fees alone are considered. 69
D. TRADE LAWS
Turkmenistan characterizes its trade policy as that of an open door. 0 Consistent with its
general positive neutrality foreign policy, Turkmenistan does not discriminate against any
country in trade, applying import measures equally, regardless of the country of origin.
With the exception of goods that present health, security, or environmental risks, Turk-
menistan does not impose quantitative restrictions on imports and does not require import
licenses or impose alternate border measures other than ordinary customs duties.
This may suggest a liberalized trade regime. In fact, import-export trade is highly re-
stricted. Through presidential decree, the government has established a peculiar system of
mandatory contract registration, which is the required prior government approval of the
prices for which a business may contract for import or export of goods.7 Without this
government approval, a firm cannot pass its goods through customs nor obtain the hard
currency necessary to pay foreign suppliers.
The state body that is responsible for contract registration is the State Commodity and
Raw Material Exchange (SCRME). Businesses are required to register all contracts for sale
of goods, including all export and import contracts, with the SCRME.72 Under the regis-
tration procedure, SCRME commodity specialists review submitted contracts to ensure that
a contract price for exported or imported goods is consistent with the average world price
level.7 The process is opaque and all decisions regarding the correctness of prices is ap-
parently fully within the discretion of SCRME specialists.7 4 There is no law or regulation
69. The fee for a license can be as high as $15,000, the fee for an annual license for a business with foreign
capital to operate a casino.
70. See TURKMENISTAN AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 4.
71. See Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 2191 (1995) (Turkm.); Postanovlenie Prezidenta
Turkmenistana No. 2615 (1996) (Turkm.).
72. Id.
73. Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 1954 (1994) (Turkm.).
74. The lack of transparent criteria for evaluation of contract prices, and the extent of the Exchange spe-
cialists' discretion, provides Exchange employees sufficient opportunity to solicit non-legal payments for con-
tract approvals, according to some businesses operating in Turkmenistan. See Administrative and Regulatory
Enviromnent, supra note 53, at 5.
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that provides the methods that these commodity specialists apply to determine the accept-
ability of submitted prices, the rights of importers and exporters, or the rights of appeal.
The reason for this contract registration system is not stated in the decree that established
it, but it appears related to government concerns to prevent hard currency flight.75 In any
event, the system is considered by businesses operating in Turkmenistan as one of the most
significant barriers to development of the private sector.76 Businesses can suffer long delays
in concluding their agreements, waiting from two weeks to four months for the required
government approval. Moreover, firms cannot freely negotiate their own contracts; gov-
ernment officials ultimately decide at what price a firm can buy or sell goods in international
trade. Firms commonly dispute the SCRME's decisions regarding prices for particular im-
ported goods, as well as the SCRME's views on the proper average world price for goods.
A consequence of this price control is that a firm may be forced to buy imported goods of
inferior quality in order to meet the SCRME's view of an appropriate price for commodities
of that kind. Moreover, because the SCRME requires imported goods to be re-sold on the
Turkmen market after importation at the price registered with the SCRME, businesses do
not have flexibility to respond to changing conditions (for example, discounting price for
excess inventory or goods damaged after importation).
Foreign investors are subject to an additional layer of government control in their inter-
national trade transactions. The SAFI is charged by a presidential decree with authority to
assess and control the implementation of programs or projects of private enterprises that
involve the participation of foreign capital (for example, projects of joint ventures, wholly
or partially foreign owned firms, concessions, and so on), a control that extends to approval
of the "volume and cost particulars of imported equipment and materials."77 In other words,
contracts for import of goods to carry out investment projects are subject to review once
by the SAFI and again by the SCRME, resulting in further delays in carrying out ordinary
business operations.
Apart from the obligation to obtain government approval of import-export contracts
through registration with the SCRME and the SAFI, Turkmen firms are required by law
to repatriate proceeds of their export sales."8 This control is exercised by customs and the
banks by means of a export passport.7 9 Generally, an exporter is required to submit his sales
contract and export passport to his bank, which in turn submits the documentation to the
Central Bank for approval. The purpose is to provide procedures by which the Central
Bank may monitor whether payment is received to the account by the exporter and to alert
the state tax inspectorate to take punitive action if payment does not arrive.
Exporters have complained that the export passport procedure transaction requirement
permits the government to interfere in purely private contractual matters. Among other
restrictions, the decree requires that export proceeds be transferred into the account of the
75. Specifically, the contract registration procedure may be intended by the government to prevent firms
from overvaluing imports and undervaluing exports in order to avoid controls on transfer of hard currency
from the country. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Customs duty avoidance does not seem to be
the purpose of the control, as the controls apply to exports-which generally are not subject to tariffs-and to
contracts for imported goods, regardless of whether they are subject to duty.
76. See Administrative and Regulatory Environment, supra note 53, at 4-6.
77. See State Registrar Decree, supra note 56.
78. Zakon Turkmenistana 0 Valumom Regulerovanim, art. 10 (1993) (Turkm.) [hereinafter Law on Foreign
Exchange Control].
79. Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 4516 (2000) (Turkm.).
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exporter in the banks of Turkmenistan, prohibits cash payments for imported goods, and
prohibits contract payment terms of more than ninety days of customs clearance (exports)
or money transfer (imports). When export proceeds are not received in part or full, the
state tax inspectorate may penalize the exporter an amount equivalent to 100 percent of
the proceeds not received.
E. FOREIGN ExcHANGE CONrROLS
An important disincentive to doing business in Turkmenistan is the government's limi-
tation on access to hard currency. Under Turkmenistan's currency control law, residents
and nonresidents are provided the right to convert local currency-the manat-into foreign
currency "without limitations or inordinate delays. '80 Until late 1998, businesses operating
in Turkmenistan could in fact freely exchange their manat earnings for dollars or other
hard currency through commercial banks and other government-authorized outlets. How-
ever, in December 1998, the commercial exchange points were effectively shut down by
presidential decree, and the government severely limited firms' access to hard currency.
The result has been both severe limitations and inordinate delays for businesses who require
hard currency.
The decision to restrict access to hard currency was taken following a rapid depreciation
of the manat in the commercial market following the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998.1
Although that crisis has ended, the restrictions continue today due, at least in part, to the
country's falling supply of hard currency (itself the result of a drop in natural gas exports,
the main source of Turkmenistan's foreign currency earnings), most of which is under the
direct personal control of the president and subject to competing demands.
At present, businesses may therefore apply for permission to convert manat to hard cur-
rency only for limited purposes. These include (1) purchase of raw materials and other
industrial products required for production of goods and services; (2) repatriation of foreign
investments and profits (provided the status of the applicant as a registered foreign investor
is confirmed by the SAFI and the state tax inspectorate confirms all taxes due have been
paid); and (3) purchase of consumer goods and food products, other than spirits and tobacco,
for specialist shops or a shop trading in a particular kind of good such as footwear, home
electronics, and so on. 2
To obtain hard currency for one of these purposes, firms must apply to a bank licensed
by the Central Bank to deal in hard currency, which in turn submits a bid in a weekly
auction conducted by a committee (the Interbank Currency Exchange) under the Central
80. See Law on Foreign Exchange Control, supra note 78, art. 8.
81. See IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
82. Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana No. 3971 (1998) (Turkm.). The remaining purposes for which
a business may obtain hard currency are (1) payment of foreign credits granted under guarantee of the Turk-
menistan government; (2) purchase of medicine and other medical items specified under a list issued by the
Cabinet of Ministers; (3) purchase of raw materials and other industrial products required for production of
goods and services; and (4) payment of debts under foreign credit lines for support of private producers of
goods and services in Turkmenistan and purchase of necessary raw materials and spare parts for projects
implemented under such lines and programs. Conversion for these purposes relates to non-cash transactions.
With regard to cash transactions, conversion is permitted only to individuals for purposes of medical treatment
abroad; to students for purposes of study at overseas educational institutions; and to employees of state insti-
tutions for purposes of their business trips abroad. Id.
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Bank. The term auction, which suggests that the market determines prices, is a misnomer
because approved bids are always satisfied at the same rate of exchange of 5,200 manat to
$1. The auction is closed to representatives of authorized banks and government represen-
tatives, and the procedures are far from transparent. However, it is evident that because
demand for hard currency exceeds supply, bids may not be accepted and if accepted, may
be satisfied only partially.
The result is slow strangulation of business activity. Even if a business manages to surmount
the administrative and regulatory obstacles and become profitable, it may not be able to con-
vert its manat profits to hard currency if not for one of the limited purposes permitted by the
government. For example, traders, an important element of the small business sector, cannot
obtain hard currency to purchase goods through official channels unless they operate one of
the highly regulated specialist shops.8 3 Even if a firm qualifies for conversion, hard currency
is often simply not available, which forces the firm to forego purchases or lose or renegotiate
contracts at disadvantagous terms.84 Without hard currency, firms cannot buy the inputs
and equipment from abroad needed to continue to operate their businesses or to transfer
dividends or other payments required to finance the investment.
F. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
Early in its independence, Turkmenistan recognized the importance of foreign direct
investment to its economic development by enacting a special law on foreign investment.85
Typical of such laws in the region, it contains many of the usual guarantees and protections
designed to provide a legislative enclave protecting foreign investors from the turbulence
of an evolving legal regime. 6 Thus, Turkmenistan's law provides a national treatment guar-
antee, 7 a right of foreign investors to freely transfer property abroad,8 a limited right of
83. Id. In return for preferential access to hard currency, retailers are prohibited from reselling the imported
goods at more than a 30% markup. Explanatory Letter from Kh. A. Orazov, Chairman of the Central Bank
of Turkmenistan, to Exchange Bureaus of the Central Bank and to Authorized Banks (Dec. 18, 1998) (on file
with author).
84. See Administrative and Regulatory Environment, supra note 53, at 4 (reporting the experience of a firm
that waited four months for hard currency conversion).
85. Zakon Turkmenistana ob Inostrannykh Invectitisiyak v Turkmenistana (1992) (Turkm.) [hereinafter
Foreign Investment Law]. Important protections and guarantees relevant to foreign investment in Turkmen-
istan's oil and gas sector are provided by the Energy Charter Treaty, to which Turkmenistan is a signatory.
Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, available at www.encharter.org/English/FullText/
index.html. Among other requirements, the Energy Charter Treaty prohibits Turkmenistan from expropriating
the property of energy investors of other contracting parties absent a public purpose, due process, and payment
of adequate compensation; requires Turkmenistan to provide national and most-favored-nation treatment to
such investors; and requires Turkmenistan to give its consent to the settlement of disputes with investors of
contracting parties through international arbitration. Id. arts. 10-17, 26. In all these respects, the Energy
Charter Treaty provides greater protection to investors of Energy Charter countries than Turkmenistan's law
on foreign investment.
86. See Cheryl W. Gray & William W.Jarosz, Law and Regulation ofForeign Direct Investment: The Experience
from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1995).
87. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 85, art. 20 ("[tlhe legal regime for foreign investments and activities
of foreign investors directed to implementation of their investments shall not be less favorable than the
regime applicable to property, property rights, and investment activities of the legal entities and citizens of
Turkmenistan").
88. Id. art. 22 ("foreign investors and foreign employees shall have the guaranteed right to transfer freely
property abroad").
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arbitration,s9 protection against expropriation,90 and certain customs and tax privileges.9' It
also includes a stability guarantee, which is a promise that if the government makes a change
in legislation concerning foreign investment, a foreign investor is entitled at his election to
continue to apply the law in force at the moment of investment for ten years.9
The protections of the law extend both to foreign investors (that is, foreign legal entities
and persons) and to legal entities created under Turkmenistan law (under any form per-
mitted under the Law on Enterprises), in which a foreign person or entity owns at least 20
percent of the declared charter capital of the enterprise.91 The definition of investments
protected under the law is quite broad.94
Despite the guarantees provided by the foreign investment law, the law does not in fact
provide foreign-owned firms much shelter from the vagaries of state regulation that this
article describes. Some of the protections are simply overridden by other laws or policies
of government. For example, the foreign investment law guarantees foreign investors the
right to transfer property abroad, including currency. However, under Turkmenistan's cur-
rency regime, foreign investors do not have a right but only a priority claim to hard cur-
rency, and that claim is subject to competing demands on the government for conversion.
Because only a limited amount of hard currency is available, foreign investors can be subject
to the same delays for conversion as other applicants.
89. Id. art. 32 ("disputes between a foreign investor and legal entities and physical persons are subject to
trial in Turkmenistan or in arbitration upon agreement of the parties"). This provision guarantees little since
parties may always agree (with or without a foreign investment law) to resolve their dispute through arbitration
rather than through the national courts and, in any event, it might be questioned how likely it is that a
government would agree to arbitration once a dispute arises. Turkmenistan is a signatory to the Washington
Convention, which provides the forum and procedures for resolution of investment disputes between an in-
vestor and host country. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. Access to arbi-
tration under the Convention is permitted only where both parties to the dispute give consent. Id. art. 25. The
fact that Turkmenistan did not provide this consent in its national foreign investment law may be more telling
of the true state of protections offered foreign investors than the weak dispute settlement provision that is
included in the law.
90. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 85, art. 21 ("Foreign investments in Turkmenistan are not subject
to nationalization"). This provision would seem to prohibit expropriation without exception, such as expro-
priations on grounds of public interest. This absolute guarantee is, however, inconsistent with separate legis-
lation on "investment activity in Turkmenistan," which provides that an investor's property may be nationalized
provided compensation is paid. Zakon Turkmenistana Ob Investitsiony Deyatelnocti v Turkmenistana art. 22
(1993) (Turkm.). It is unclear how these inconsistencies will be resolved; to date, there have not been any
reported expropriations of foreign investor's property.
91. The custom and import tax exemption applies to property that is imported as the foreign investor's
contribution to the charter fund of the enterprise as well as goods imported for use in production by such
enterprises with foreign investment. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 85, art. 15. A tax exemption applies
to profits earned by an enterprise, and dividends paid to a foreign investor, where the foreign investor has
contributed at least 30% of the charter fund of the enterprise in hard currency. Id. art. 17. The exemption
from tax applies for the period of recovery of the initial investment, which must be specified in the foundation
documents filed with the state registration body. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 52, at 7.
92. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 85, art. 20. The validity of such stability guarantees would seem
suspect, given that a law cannot bind the actions of a future legislature, who have a constitutional power to
amend any prior law.
93. Id. arts. 2-3.
94. Id. art. 1 (defining foreign investment as "all kinds of property and intellectual values" includingcurrency,
physical property, securities, all forms of intellectual property, and services).
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The law promises that foreign investors shall receive national treatment. In fact, the legal
regime for foreign investors is in many cases more difficult than that for domestically owned
firms. One example is the registration process, under which enterprises with foreign in-
vestment undergo a more rigorous screening than domestic firms.95 Another example is
that, in contrast to legislation applicable to domestic firms, the government by a resolution
(by executive fiat and not as a result of judical process) can suspend the activities of a foreign
enterprise for "violating the legislation of Turkmenistan.19 The foreign investment law
provides that foreign investors may be required to obtain a special permission from the
Cabinet of Ministers to engage in unspecified "special kinds of activities." 97
The foreign investment law does not require a minimum capital or charter fund contri-
bution by founders of an enterprise. Nevertheless, the law does provide that the government
may liquidate an enterprise with foreign participation if its founders fail to contribute at
least 50 percent of the enterprise's declared charter capital within one year of registration.
Apart from further demonstration of government involvement in what would seem to be
private contractural matters between founders, the liquidation is a departure from the na-
tional treatment principle. At least not until passage of the new law on enterprises in 2000,
domestic companies had not been subject to such oversight.
IV. Doing Business in Turkmenistan Today
Is it possible for a private sector to develop in the harsh legal environment that exists in
Turkmenistan? According to EBRD estimates and official Turkmenistan government sta-
tistics, a private sector has developed, although it is stunted by regional or international
standards. Turkmenistan's private sector share of GDP falls somewhere between 23 percent
and 25 percent, the lowest of all former Soviet republics and satellites with the exception
of Belarus. 9s The private sector accounts for less than 10 percent of Turkmenistan's ex-
ports.99 According to government statistics, the number of registered non-state enterprises
has largely remained the same over a three-year period (1996-1998). l °° Perhaps the most
95. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
96. State Registrar Decree, supra note 56, art. 12. Cf. 1993 Enterprise Law, supra note 35, art. 30 (stating
that a court verdict is required to liquidate [domestic] enterprise for violation of Turkmenistan's legislation).
97. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 85, art. 7 ("special kinds of activities, which are determined by the
Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, may be carried out by legal entities with foreign participation only with
special permission"). Presumably this is intended to allow the government to prevent or restrict foreign in-
vestment in industries of strategic importance to Turkmenistan, such as energy.
98. EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., TRANSITION REPORT 1998, 26 (1998) (stating that private
sector share of GDP in Belarus mid-1998 was 20%). According to government sources, private sector activity
currently accounts for 35% of GDP and 50% of average employment. GOV'T OF TURKM., THE PROGRAM OF
THE PRESIDENT OF TURKMENISTAN SAPARMURAT TURKMENBASHI "STRATEGY OF SocIo-ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT
IN TURKMENISTAN FOR THE PERIOD TO 2010" 195 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S 10-YEAR PLAN].
99. As noted, over 90% of Turkmenistan's exports are gas, oil, and cotton. See supra note 10 and accom-
panying text. Export of these commodities is carried out by state enterprises. See IMF REPORT, supra note 5,
at 13-14, 62.
100. NAT'L INST. OF STATISTICS AND FORECAST OF TURKM., Soclo-EcoNoMIC SITUATION OF TURKMENISTAN
JANUARY-JUNE 1999 (1999). This source indicates that the number of non-state enterprises increased by 4%
between 1996 and 1997, but then decreased by 3.5% in 1998. Non-state enterprises are considered by the
government statistics authority to be (1) private businesses; (2) cooperatives; (3) public organizations (i.e.,
NGOs and charitable organizations); (4) entities of mixed ownership (state and non-state) with foreign capital;
(5) entities of mixed ownership without foreign capital; and (6) foreign businesses. Because the statistics au-
thority includes within the category of non-state enterprises entities that are owned in part by the state (entities
of mixed ownership), its estimate of number of private sector legal entities may be somewhat inflated.
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telling judgment of the state of the business environment is that the level of foreign direct
investment has steadily declined as Turkmenistan's transition has progressed from a peak
of $223 million in 1995 to $108 million in 1998,101 an amount that is far less than any of
the other Caspian oil- or gas-exporting economies in transition. 102
If there are elements of the private sector that can operate in Turkmenistan's harsh legal
environment, it may be individual entrepreneurs, particularly traders, operating either of-
ficially or in the shadow economy. Government statistics indicate significant growth in the
number of registered individual entrepreneurs, which are single persons who engage in
business "without creating a legal person." 103 Many of these entrepreneurs appear to be
engaged in trade, including the so-called small-scale shuttle trade with neighboring coun-
tries. 104 The private sector was thus responsible for about one-third of Turkmenistan's total
imports by value in early 1999.105 It is these forms of business that because of their small
size and kind of activity, may perhaps attract less attention from the state than a foreign
investor or larger enterprise and are thus less affected by the harshness of the legal regime.
Ten years after independence, the propects for Turkmenistan's transition to a market-
based commercial law regime appear much as they did during the ten years before inde-
pendence at the start of transition. Officially, the state continues to promote the importance
of the private sector to national development. Thus, the president's socioeconomic plan for
the first decade of the twenty-first century calls for "deepening domestic economic reforms
oriented on market relations" with the optimistic goals of doubling foreign investment and
increasing private sector share of GDP to 66 percent from its current 20 percent.10 6 Despite
these ambitious goals, the government has not demonstrated great willingness to relax its
grip on private sector activity. While the country's vast gas and other natural resources will
101. See U.S. Embassy Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, an Overview of the GOTX Investment Policy (Apr. 6,
1999), at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/990910t1 .hun; see also IMF REPORT, supra note 5, at 50 (indicating
that the decline in FDI to Turkmenistan is due to "policies ... not supportive of foreign investment" as well
as disappointing results of recent oil explorations in the Caspian Sea); BISNIS COMMERCIAL OVERVIEW, supra
note 7, ch.VII. ("The government does not publish statistics on direct foreign investment in Turkmenistan.
Turkmen officials generally blur the line between trade and investment. In fact, there are very few 'investors'
in the sense of having an equity share in a local enterprise.")
102. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRAoE AND DEv., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROss-BORDERMERG-
ERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRY FACT SHEETS, at www.unctad.org/en/pub/
ps4wir00fs.en.htm (Oct. 3, 2000) (indicating that the amount of foreign direct investment into Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Russia in 1998 was $1.02, $1.15, and $2.76 billion, respectively).
103. In July 1999, such businesses numbered 41,500, growing by 21% over one year from July 1998. NAT'L
INST. OF STATISTICS AND FORECAST OF TURKM., supra note 100, at 106.
104. Shuttle trade (also known as suitcase trade) is widely developed between Turkmenistan and other CIS
countries on the one hand, and China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran on the other. Shuttle
traders are individuals who travel to one of these countries to purchase consumer goods, such as electronics,
clothing, perfumes, or pharmecuticals, for resale at home. The precise level of such trade is difficult to gauge,
as much of it is smuggled. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., THE INTEGRATION OF SELECTED ECON-
OMIES IN TRANSITION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR TRADE
WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at pars. 43, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/3 (1998).
105. The non-state sector's share of total imports into Turkmenistan by value was 21.7% in 1997, 32.5%
in 1998, and 33.1% in the 1st quarter of 1999. NAT'L INST. OF STATISTICS AND FORECAST OF TURRM., SUpra
note 100.
106. PRESIDENT's 10-YEAR PLAN, supra note 98, at 240, 274. The plan was prepared under the "direct
guidance and with personal participation of Saparmurat Turmenbashi, emboding his strategic plans, scientific
ideas and ... practical recommendations," id. at 182, and is Turkmenistan's official blueprint for its second
decade of independence.
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continue to be a significant inducement of foreign investment, the state's domination of,
and pervasive interference in, private sector business relationships of the kind described in
this article cannot but make potential investors wary. Absent some significant shift in the
government's relationship to the private sector, it is likely that Turkmenistan's transition
will remain stalled and that the golden age of the Turkmen people predicted by President
Turkmenbashi will remain elusive. 1°7
107. "Being confident, proud of its independent Motherland, courageous and united [the] Turkmen people,
with their wise leader-Serdar Saparmurat Turmenbashi-are [to] enter the 'Golden Age' [with a] solid spiritual
and reliable economic foundation." PREsIoNr's 10-YR& PLAN, supra note 98, at 200.
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